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THESIS ABSTRACT
NAME: Taher A. Al-shehari
TITLE OF STUDY: Web Browsers Resistance to Traffic Analysis Attacks
MAJOR FIELD: Department of Information and Computer Science
DATE OF DEGREE: November 29, 2014
Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) is the most recent field of security focus-
ing on protecting network communications from traffic analysis attacks. The main
idea of PETs is to establish an encrypted tunnel to hide the contents and addresses
of users from external observers. One of the most popular anonymity systems is
The Onion Routing (Tor) with more than 4,000,000 users and around 4500 re-
lays. The popularity of Tor is gained from protecting users’ confidential activities
and personal privacy by hiding their locations and traffic contents against traffic
analysis attack. Although Tor is considered as the most commonly used anonymity
system, an attacker can recognize visited web pages over Tor by exploiting some
features inferred from observed traffic (e.g., packets sizes, directions, timings, etc).
A recent and popular traffic analysis attack is called website fingerprinting. Ex-
isting website fingerprinting attacks identify visited web pages on Tor using just a
xii
single web browser namely ”Firefox”. However, the web users around the world
use Tor to protect their privacy over various browsers. In this thesis we setup a
website fingerprinting attack on ”Tor” to investigate different levels of resistance
of the most commonly used browsers against traffic analysis attack based on fea-
tures inferred from their traffic patterns. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first comparative analysis study involving browsers resistance against website
fingerprinting attack based on a deep analysis that reaches the main causes that
stand behind those different resistances. The aims of applying web page finger-
printing attack on top web browsers are three folds: First, to expose the possible
vulnerabilities in (Tor and browsers) that the attacker may exploit in order to push
Tor and browsers makers to empower their products to defeat any possible exploits
by attackers. Second, to raise web users awareness for more privacy protection
by selecting the browser with the highest privacy protection. Third, the outcomes
of our research might be very beneficial to security forces and law enforcement
of the governments to highlight what are the web pages their citizens may visit
anonymously on different browsers. Our empirical results showed to which extent
each browser protects against web page fingerprinting attack as well as exposing
the root causes stand behind different resistances of browsers.
xiii
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 الرسالةملخص 
 "العنكبوتيةعبرالشبكه  المارةمقاومة متصفحات الإنترنت للهجوم عن طريق تحليل البيانات "
 : طاهر علي يحيى الشهاريالاسم
 تاالقسم: علوم الحاسب الآلي والمعلوم
 التخصص: علوم الحاسوب 
  72\01\4102: المناقشةتاريخ 
في أمن المعلومات والتي تركز على حماية  الحديثةمن أهم المجالات  الخصوصيةتعتبر تقنيات حماية 
 الفكرةعبر الشبكات. إن  المارةعن طريق تحليل خصائص البيانات  الاختراقيةمن الهجمات  الشبكيةالاتصالات 
مستخدمي بيانات مشفره لإخفاء محتويات وعناوين  اتصالهو إنشاء قناة  الخصوصيةوراء تقنيات حماية  الرئيسية
أكثر تقنيات حماية   ”roT“تور  التعمية. يعتبر نظام الشبكةالإنترنت من المتنصتين المحتملين عبر نطاق 
مستخدم. على الرغم من أن نظام تور يعتبر من أقوى   000,000,4شيوعا ًحيث يستخدمه حاليا ًأكثر من  الخصوصية
إلا أن بيانات مستخدميه مهدده بإمكانية وجود المتنصتين المجهولين بين نقطتي الاتصال(الزبون  التعميةأنظمة 
عبر  المارةبعض خصائص البيانات  استنتاجوالخادم) الذين يمكن أن يكشفوا هوية المواقع التي يتصفحونها من خلال 
تقنيات لكسر نظام  السابقة). لقد طبقت الأبحاث ، التوقيت بينهم، .. إلخاتجاههم(أحجام رزم البيانات،  مثل الشبكة
مرور من خلال استنتاج خصائص نمط  الضحيةالمواقع التي يتصفحها  هويةتور عن طريق التعرف على  التعمية
 مختلفةباستخدام متصفح واحد فقط "فايرفوكس". إن مستخدمي الانترنت حول العالم يستخدمون متصفحات  البيانات
 التعميةبكسر نظام  البحثية لأطروحةاتور، لذا لقد قمنا في هذه  التعميةن المتنصتين عبر نظام لحماية خصوصيتهم م
باستخدام أكثر المتصفحات شيوعاً (فايرفوكس، انترنت  الضحيةالمواقع التي يتصفحها  هويةتور للتعرف على 
التي استخدمت و السابقة). إن هذا البحث يتغلب على جوانب القصور في البحوث سفاري، أوبيرااكسبلورر، كرووم، 
أكثر خمسه متصفحات التي يقوم  المقاومةتحليليه لمدى  دراسةمتصفح ويب واحد "فايرفوكس" من خلال قيامنا بعمل 
تحليليه عميقه  بدراسةا إلى ذلك لقد قمن بالإضافة .عبرا لشبكه لحماية البيانات من المتنصتينحول العالم  استخداما
الذي يقوم بها كل متصفح لحماية خصوصية  المقاومةمدى  للمتصفحات التي تقف خلف الجذريةالأسباب  لاستنتاج
من  الحكوماتجداً لقوات أمن المعلومات وتطبيق القانون في  مفيدةتعتبر نتائج مخرجات هذا البحث   مستخدميه.
التي يمتع بها كل متصفح ضد  الخصوصيةالضعف في حماية  خلال وضع صوره واضحه عن مدى القوة و
تور من تصفح المواقع التي تعتبر ممنوعه في  التعميةوأيضا مراقبة المستخدمين الذين يستخدمون نظام  المتنصتين
  .تلك الدول 
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web (WWW) makes modern life much more convenient as the
people relay massively on the internet in several daily activities, but there are
real threats in which their privacy and anonymity might be violated. The privacy
and anonymity of web users can be endangered by possible attackers using some
tools to eavesdrop their activities. When internet users browse the web, their vis-
ited websites destinations are revealed to several routers along the way. External
observers such as private and governmental security agencies may passively ob-
serve and collect information by monitoring and censoring users’ activities on the
internet. Therefore, the anonymity systems on the internet are very important
to hide the privacy of people who want to surf the web for their critical needs
such as sending secret E-mails and making online business. Earlier encryption
techniques like secure shell (SSL) have been used for encrypting the contents of
the web from being fetched by attackers but the identity of the user can be mon-
itored using some information extracted from packets headers. To hide both the
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addresses of users and the contents of their traffic, advanced anonymous systems
such as Tor [32] and Jap [8] are proposed to protect web users from such threats
by allowing them to communicate and share information safely without hurting
their privacy. Although Tor is considered as a strong anonymity system, its users
can be endangered by local traffic analysis attacks that can be placed between the
client and server to uncover the identity of the requested web sites even though
the traffic is encrypted. The main target of our research is to investigate the be-
havior of the most commonly used web browsers in protecting web users against
website fingerprinting attack over Tor anonymity system by conducting our pro-
posed attack explained later. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
push the boundary of knowledge from this angle. Furthermore, the outcomes of
our research might be very beneficial to the security forces and law enforcement
worldwide.
1.1 Privacy issues in Internet
The rapid advance of technology and growth of Internet raise the concern of
users from possible online threats that may endanger their privacy. In order to
understand privacy issues perfectly, we need to define the meaning of ”privacy”.
Warren and Brandeis [83] defined privacy as the ”right to be let alone”. Roger
Clarke suggested that ”Privacy is the interest that individuals have sustaining
in a personal space, free from interference by other people and organizations”
[24]. However, the privacy of web users is satisfied when the usage, exchange
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and release of their information can be one hundred percent under control [27].
Unfortunately, this is not the case as data is transmitted on cyberspace and the
users do not maintain full control over their information, so the privacy attack can
occur. As the individuals join to the Internet, their information may become out
of their control with the presence of several threats (e.g. Malwares, traffic analysis
attacks, etc). Therefore, a local observer on an ISP or attacker on a WLAN can
analyze and track information sent or received to a victim efficiently, inexpensively
and unconsciously. The privacy issues that most users are concerned with include
[23]:
 The nature of their visited websites which can be revealed using website
fingerprinting attack.
 Their E-mail addresses and contact information that can be used for targeted
advertisement and other purposes.
 Their personal information that can be misused and exported against users’
preference and interest.
 Their Passwords and Credit card information.
 Their locations/origin on Internet space.
These are the most important privacy issues that should raise people awareness
to know possible sources that threaten their privacy. Figure 1.1 shows possible
adversaries that may carry out such kind of privacy violations which web users
should take care of. Therefore, users must take several precautions to protect their
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privacy against such privacy issues as well as designing containment strategies once
their personal information has been collected.
Figure 1.1: A survey conducted by Pew Research Center’s internet and american
life project omnibus in July 2013, shows possible eavesdroppers that may violate
the privacy of web users [66].
To solve privacy issues on the internet, multiple privacy enhancing technolo-
gies have been proposed (e.g. SSL, IPSec, SSH, Tor, etc) so theses encryption
mechanisms hide the content of transferred data but there are still some valuable
information that can be exploited be attackers such as size, direction, order, and
timing of the transmitted packets between client and server. For example, in web-
site fingerprinting attack the attackers use this information to identify a web page
that a victim visits. Several individuals such as journalists, human rights work-
ers, the military, and ordinary citizens, employ anonymity systems to protect their
identities on the Internet. Internet users’ privacy issues have been highlighted in
many published works such as [30], [17], [19], [55], and [75] .
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1.2 Anonymity protocols
In this section we define the meaning of ”anonymity” in term of our research and
what are the most commonly used anonymity systems. Pfitzmann et al. defined
anonymity as ”the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the
anonymity set.” [63]. They meant by the anonymity set are the set of all pos-
sible players in the system such as the sender, known as the sender anonymity
set, the recipient, the recipient anonymity set, of a specific message. Because of
the high increase of traffic analysis attacks, several anonymity systems have been
developed in order to enhance the security and privacy of users over the internet.
These anonymity tools provide privacy protection by encrypting the transmitted
data ranging from simple to complicated method. For example, Chaum [18] is
the first who proposed a system that provides a level of anonymity by establish-
ing a connection that mixes certain traffic with other traffic connections. Later,
several systems have been proposed which employ a wide number of sophisticated
techniques that are summarized in the following points:
 Setting up various proxies through multiple number of systems worldwide
in order to hide the source of the connection from its destination.
 The packets flows are mixed and reordered.
 The packets sizes are padded into a fixed length.
 The packets flow rates are controlled with any batching strategy or timer.
 The data packets are covered using some strategies (e.g. tunnels, onion
5
routing, etc) [25].
Different anonymity systems employ the aforementioned techniques in order to
make it very difficult for attackers to trace and analyze the traffic. Some systems
use timing techniques to modify the timing of packets flows which has a great ef-
fect on the system. The systems that are based on timing techniques are classified
into two classes. First, High-latency systems ,which are much better at protect-
ing possible attacks, are based on timings such as Mixminion [28] and Mixmaster
[74]. These systems employ strategies such as mixing, reordering and patching to
defend against traffic analysis attacks that are based on packet timings ”delays”
[53]. The anonymous systems that work based on timing strategies are not as
widely used due to the extra delays that they add in data transmission. Second,
Low-latency systems that have been used suitably for web browsing protocols such
as HTTP and interactive protocols such as SSH because they do not disrupt the
timing of packets during the communication. The systems that underlie this cate-
gory are The Onion Routing (Tor) [32], Java Anon Proxy (JAP) [8], and Invisible
Internet Protocol (I2P) [48]. In our experiments we select Tor anonymous system
to evaluate different levels of browsers resistances as it is the most commonly used
system of desirable Low-latency systems. Anonymity systems can be utilized by
users in both an illegal and legal sides. For example, they can be misused in mis-
appropriation of funds and terrorist actions so researches for breaking anonymous
systems like ours can be much more helpful for governments to track such kinds of
criminal processes. On the other hand, a lot of people employ anonymity systems
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in multiple legal fields such as e-banking, e-voting, e-commerce, and e-auction,
etc. However, several anonymous systems [59], [99], [82], [31], [3], and [50] with
different features and encryption mechanisms have been used by web users to
protect their privacy from real threats that appeared in last decade.
1.3 Traffic Analysis Attacks on Anonymity Pro-
tocols
Traffic analysis term refers to the process of profiling and monitoring network
traffic in order to identify the nature and behavior of parties that generate certain
traffic pattern such as web browser (the client) and website (the server). Traffic
analysis can be implemented equally in both encrypted and non-encrypted traffic
and it is based on the observation of the traffic generated during the communi-
cation. It is easy for possible eavesdroppers to show the contents of transmitted
data by capturing transmitted packets using free available capturing tool such as
Wireshark, tcpdump, etc. Then, many features can be deduced from captured
packets, so a potential adversary exploits those features to track and correlate
a user’s browsing activities such as who is talking (the source), to whom they
are talking (the destination), type of visited sites, etc. Consequently, it is very
important to encrypt sensitive information from being observed by eavesdroppers
when it is transmitted through the internet.
However, the anonymous systems do not guarantee protecting the privacy of
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users completely because the eavesdroppers can exploit some information (packet
sizes, timing, ordering, etc) inferred from encrypted traffic transmitted between
clients and remote servers. As a result, several traffic analysis attacks can be
conducted for illegal purposes (e.g., infering the identity of visited website by
a victim, fingerprinting browsers to exploit their vulnerabilities, etc). On the
other hand, researchers implement various traffic analysis attacks to improve the
security of Privacy Enhancing Technologies by exploring their vulnerabilities in
order to push anonymous systems vendors to add novel defences against such
attacks.
In this section we explore the most well-known examples of traffic analysis
attacks on encrypted systems. For example, Song et al. established profiles of
typing characteristics of users in order to guess the keys that the user types under
Secure Shell (SSH) session [70]. They used Hidden Markov model to predict the
sequences of pressed keys since SSH protocol transmits each pressed key into its
own separate packet across the network. They were able to measure the delays
between packets then matching them to pre-determined delays of a combination
of certain keys. The aim of this attack is to enhance the probability of breaking
passwords over SSH protocol. Moreover, Hints [41] used traffic analysis attack to
identify the website that the user may visit based of unique signature of loaded
resources of a certain HTTPS website (e.g. HTML document, CSS files, JS,
images, etc). He created profiles of timing signatures to detect visited websites
over Security Shell Layer (SSL). More robust website fingerprinting attacks on a
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broader variety of encrypted systems are proposed by Bissias et al [11], Liberatore
et al [49], Herrmann et al [39], Shi and Matsuura [69], Cai et al [15], and most
recently Wang et al. [81].
1.4 Website Fingerprinting
Hints [41] is the first who described the traffic analysis for identifying visited
websites as a term ”Web site Fingerprinting”. Website fingerprinting is one kind
of traffic analysis attacks which enables the adversary to infer a visited web page
that the victim may visit for violating his privacy even if the victim uses certain
anonymous system like Tor [65]. It is a process of footprint information of a target
web page based on inferred features from its traffic pattern.
When a user visits a certain web page, the HTML document of that page will
be fetched with its referenced contents (e.g. CSSs, JSs, Images, Text, etc). Each
fetched content has specific characteristics(size, order, direction, delay). Encrypt-
ing protocols (e.g. encrypting tunnels, SSL, Tor) encrypt the contents of transmit-
ted information but they do not effectively encrypt some features such as packets
sizes, directions, timing, etc[14]. Therefore, it is possible for an eavesdropper to
monitor/sniff the network traffic of a victim and profile fingerprint about web
page contents based on (order, direction, timing, and sizes) of the packets used
to load a target web page. Thus, the set of extracted information for a given web
page comprises a unique fingerprint for that page. Using such fingerprint method,
a visited website can be uniquely identifiable even if the connection is encrypted
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using any anonymous system such as SSL, SSH, Tor, etc. For example, Website
fingerprinting process on encrypted traffic can be used by governments to censor
and block some web pages that they mark them as illegal websites. Using the
previously mentioned web page features, a government can generate fingerprints
for all banned websites. Then, they censor and sniff all traffic that matches all
previously recorded fingerprints of banned list of websites. Furthermore, they
can avoid monitoring a huge amount of traffic and focus only https traffic that
comprises a very small portion of Internet traffic. Some websites are changed con-
tinuously (e.g. news websites) so the government should generate new fingerprints
frequently to cope such changes [41].
Existing works in website fingerprinting attacks [11], [61], [11], [39], [15], and
[81] show that this kind of traffic analysis attack is possible against several anony-
mous systems like SSH, IPSec tunnels, JAP, and Tor. Consequently, vendors of
these systems tray to defeat these kind of attacks by using several techniques and
tricks that are specified in Section 1.2. We select Tor as it is the most popular
anonymous system in use today ”currently used by around 500,000 daily clients
and carrying 2000 MB of data per second”[64]. More details about website fin-
gerprinting attack over Tor are explored in Chapter 2. In our experiments we set
up a website fingerprinting attack using most commonly used browsers on real
user who defends himself using Tor for the sake of investigating to which extent
each browser defends against such website fingerprinting attack. Our research
outperforms existing ones in that it breaks Tor anonymous system using most
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commonly used browsers while all existing works without exception used only
Firefox browser.
1.5 Web Browsers
Today, more and more services and a variety of information contents (e.g. HTML,
images, video, etc) become available on the Internet ”Web servers”. These con-
tents are accessed and retrieved using web browsers such as Chrome, FF, IE, etc.
Web browser acts as an interface between web user and web server, so the need for
fast and secure browsing experience is more important to satisfy the experience
of end users. Recently, the market of web browsers becomes highly competitive
to fulfill the World Wide Web (WWW) demands of people securely and privately.
Internet browser is the client-side application in internet communication and
its main function is to fetch the requested contents from web server and display
them on browser’s window. The web contents are fetched in the form of requests
and responses between web browsers and web servers by implementing Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and its secure version (HTTPS). Before the evolution
of the web, the web pages were very simple HTML pages containing simple con-
tents (e.g. text, input boxes, and buttons) [10]. Currently, web pages contain
multimedia contents (e.g. JSs, CSSs, flashes, audio, etc) so many people use
different browsers to perform many tasks (e.g. access email, buy products, do
research, etc). Therefore, web browsers are essential part of people daily live so
they are built with a lot of functions to perform those tasks and protect user from
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any malicious content residing on the World Wide Web. The details behind dif-
ferent browsers’ structure and features are described in Chapter 3. Our focus in
this study is to evaluate different resistance levels of top five web browsers against
website fingerprinting attack as they have relative importance among applications
today. In this research we select the most commonly used web browsers namely
Chrome, Firefox, Internet explorer, Safari, and Opera according to market share
statistics of browsers [?] as it is shown in the distribution of pie chart in Figure
1.2.
Figure 1.2: Browsers’ Statistics and Trends On May, 2013. Source:
http://gs.statcounter.com/
1.6 Objectives of the research
Recent attacks on data streamed over Tor identify the websites that the victim
may visit just only under Firefox web browser. The question is why we do not
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apply traffic analysis attack on the most commonly used web browsers to see their
resistances against traffic analysis attack as a lot of users browse the internet
anonymously using different web browsers? To answer our research question, we
build a model to test various resistance levels of popular web browsers by making
a lot of experiments on tested browsers (e.g., various web technologies, Java Script
APIs, parallel downloads, etc) in order to reach into the root causes that make
each browser behave differently. Our approach highlights a clear picture of the
resistance of each browser against website fingerprinting attack outperforming
the previous approaches that share the same shortcoming which is a single web
browser (Firefox).
1.7 Methodology
Our methodology in this research is to study, design, and implement a website
fingerprinting attack for evaluating the resistance behavior of web browsers on
Tor anonymity system. It consists of the following research phases:
1. Study and survey the existing literature of website fingerprinting approaches.
2. Carry out a technical survey on the five commonly used web browsers
(Chrome, FF, IE, Safari, and Opera) to clarify their differences in terms
of layout engines, Java Script engines, and HTML/CSS features, etc.
3. Set up sniffing modules/scripts for capturing web pages traffic using a strong
network sniffing tool ”tshark” ,the command line version of wireshark traffic
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analyzer.
4. Parsing and filtering captured traffic to isolate Tor packets and browsers’
relevant packets from the rest of the traffic.
5. Construct websites fingerprints based on certain features (packets sizes and
directions) which serve as an input to a classification phase.
6. Carry out a comparative study of the top five web browsers to assess the
variations of their resistances to website fingerprinting attack in terms of
recognition accuracy of each browser.
1.8 Overview of contributions
The contribution of this thesis is to fingerprint websites being accessed over Tor
using the five most popular web browsers. The main contributions of our research
are as follow:
1. Carry out a deep analysis of the most commonly used web browsers to
identify key differences and similarities in the rendering engines, the fetching
schemes, etc.
2. Investigate website fingerprinting attack on Tor anonymity system taking
into consideration the most relevant features that improve the accuracy of
website fingerprinting which can be used also for ”web browser fingerprint-
ing”.
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3. Carry out a comparative analysis with respect to the resistance of the most
commonly used web browsers to traffic analysis attacks on Tor.
4. Publish the outcomes of our research in reputable journals and conferences
as well as patents.
1.9 Thesis organization
In Chapter 1 we outline the motivation and relevant background behind the topics
discussed in this thesis. Section 1.1 explores the rapidly growing field of privacy
issues on the internet and shows its importance as a field of study. Section 1.2
outlines the importance of anonymity systems and their various encryption tech-
niques as well as their types and uses. Section 1.3 displays a brief introduction
of traffic analysis attack on anonymity systems and shows the most important
examples of traffic analysis attacks for improving the effectiveness of end users’
privacy under various anonymity systems. A brief overview of the most com-
monly used browsers and their trends are explored in Section 1.4. Chapter 3 is
dedicated for more details behind web browsers as they are the main topic of
this research. Furthermore, Section 1.5 describes the main objectives of this re-
search and the primary questions that we seek to answer. Section 1.6 outlines
the research methodology that we followed to reach to our objectives. Section
1.7 explores our main contributions. The sequence organization of this thesis is
highlighted in Section 1.8.
Chapter 2 demonstrates many concepts behind Tor anonymity system. An
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overview of what is Tor and its implementation fields as well as its main security
features and usage statistics are explored in Section 2.1. The technique that Tor
uses to establish Tor circuit for anonymous communication is explored in Section
2.2 such as how it selects the relays, associates encryption keys, etc. The summary
of the existing published researches are explored in Section 2.3.
More functional details behind web browsers are illustrated in Chapter 3. An
overview of typical architecture of browsers and how their internal components
work are explained in Section 3.1. The core components of browsers that af-
fect their rendering behavior are demonstrated in Section 3.2. The main task of
browsers rendering/layout engines and their types are clarified in 3.2.1 Subsec-
tion. Web browsers Java Script engine/interpreters and their functionalities are
explained in 3.2.2 Subsection. In 3.2.3 Subsection, the JS and CSS web contents,
and web technologies that have an impact on web browsers traffic patterns are
explained.
Chapter 4 demonstrates our website fingerprinting attack to investigate the
various resistance levels of browsers against website fingerprinting attack. The
detailed description of the experimental platform is presented in Section 4.1 fol-
lowed by a presentation of the data collection and preprocessing phases that are
demonstrated in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we explained the applied approach
that we implement to validate the various resistances of browsers against website
fingerprinting attack over Tor.
Chapter 5 evaluates the root causes behind various resistances of tested
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browsers. The comparison of browsers’ web technologies is evaluated in Sec-
tion 5.1. The results of the factors that affect the traffic patterns of browsers (
JavaScript, Third-party domains ,parallel download and time optimization) are
evaluated in 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, and 5.2.4 Subsections respectively. Sections
5.3 and its related subsections we summarized the discussion of some web issues
and dynamism of network condition that add a noisy on traffic patterns and re-
duce the privacy protections introduced by browsers. Some recommendations that
raise the resistances of browsers against website fingerprinting attack are pointed
in 5.3.3 Subsection.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarizing the findings and some hot
research points that can be guided as hints for further future works.
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CHAPTER 2
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS ON TOR
ANONYMITY SYSTEM
Many governments worldwide consider viewing certain web pages by their citizens
as an illegal action. For instance, in China more than 2600 websites were blocked
as illegal sites and they put under the policy internet censorship of the country [95].
Furthermore, internet censorship in Iran has been increased with 50 percent of the
top 500 visited websites (e.g. Facebook, Google Plus, Twitter, etc) [92]. These
restrictions trigger people in such countries to use different anonymity systems
(e.g. Tor, JAP, SSL, etc) to bypass online censorship and surveillance systems
and browse freely. In our research we select Tor to evaluate the resistance of
browsers against fingerprinting attack as it is the most commonly used anonymity
system. Moreover, there are relatively a few research on website fingerprinting
attacks on Tor.
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2.1 Overview of Tor system
Tor is the anonymity system that was developed primarily by U.S. Navy to protect
the communications of the US government. Later it has been donated to the open
source community to have clients of more than 126 countries around the world [5].
It is an overlay network of virtual tunnels that is built via layered encryption mode
called Onion Routing. It was built to anonymize TCP-Based services such as web
browsing, instant messages and secure shell. Tor is an open network that helps
users defend against a form of network surveillance that threaten their privacy,
confidential business activities and relationships. Based on the statistics in [64],
Tor recently is the largest deployed anonymous communication network in the
world. From its first release in 2004, there are many attacks that illustrate several
of its vulnerabilities. These attacks push Tor’s designers to enhance its anonymity
protection with several modifications and improvements. The main recognizable
features of Tor protocol system are as follow:
 Renewal of circuits: Tor has perfect forward strategy in which it builds a
circuit of three relays in the first of each negotiation session and this circuit
is changed periodically.
 Reduce the latency: in which the TCP stream are multiplex in a circuit to
which help in reduce latency.
 Reliability and anonymity: Tor makes it difficult to modify transmitted
data and describe its relays because the transactions between relays are
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TLS based.
 Preventing end-to-end attack: Tor has leak pipe circuit topology feature
in which it is responsible for directing traffic to nodes pathway down the
circuit, meaning that the traffic can exit the circuit at the middle, thereby
prevent end-to-end attack.
In its first deployment, Tor has only 250 relays with just about 50,000 users,
however at present there are over 4000 relays and around 4000000 daily users all
around the world as it is shown in the following Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
Figure 2.1: Recent statistics of the number of Tor users around the world. Source:
http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en.
Tor is used for different purposes; the military use Tor to hide their location
and protect military operations, normal People use Tor to protect their privacy
such as protecting their children from being stolen by corrupt marketers and
thieves, bloggers use Tor to avoid being sued or fired for saying completely legal
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Figure 2.2: Recent trend of the number of Tor relays around the world. Source:
http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en.
things online, journalists use Tor to investigate state propaganda and opposing
viewpoints, activists use Tor to anonymously report abuses from dangerous zones
in the world, law enforcement officers use Tor for carrying undetected surveillance
on questionable websites [28],[67],[72], and [73]. Furthermore, Tor has been used
by political opponents in non free countries (e.g. Iran, China, etc) to access banned
web pages (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc). Therefore, Tor encrypts the origin/place
and contents of transmitted data from being exposed by possible eavesdroppers.
2.2 How does Tor work?
The main goal of Tor anonymity system is to make it very difficult for an attacker
at the source point to determine the destination of a request, or an attacker at
the destination point to determine the source of a request. This can be done by
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three components that play important roles in establishing Tor’s circuit session
which are the client, the server, and three Tor relays in between [65]. Tor client
establishes its circuit by negotiating an individual shared secret with each node
of the three circuit relays: entry/guard relay, middle relay, and exit relay as it is
demonstrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Tor circuit components: the client node, the des-
tination node, and the three relays in between. Source:
http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en.
The transmission of the traffic is encrypted using three shared secret keys that
are negotiated with the three relays of established Tor’s circuit. Each relay in
Tor network knows only its successor and predecessor, so this technique of Tor
provides strong resistance against data analysis attacks of man-in-the-middle [65].
When the client establishes an anonymous connection with the server, the proxy
of client starts to select three relays randomly from list of Tor relays residing in
directory server as it is shown in Figure 2.4. The relays of Tor selected based on
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certain algorithm that depends on various Tor relays statistics that are distributed
by the directory server such as some client history and preferences [1].
Figure 2.4: The Onion Routing technique of Tor in which the client sends a
message to a server wrapped with encrypted layers[65].
The proxy of Tor client establishes session key with the first Entry relay after
selecting and meeting the policy of Exit relay. Then, the tunnel is extended from
the entry relay incrementally one node at a time up to the exit node [65]. After
establishing Tor network, the client communicates with the server anonymously.
Throughout the Tor anonymity network, the entry/guard relay knows just only
the next relay in the path and this is applied for the next relay up to the exit relay.
After establishing the Tor anonymity network, many virtual circuits are created
periodically so transmitted traffic is routed and multiplexed to the destination.
During the connection the transmitted message is sent from relay to relay along
the circuit so in each relay the encryption layer of that relay/node is puled off
until the original message reach to exit relay. The origin of transmitted message
appears at the Tor exit relay so it will be forwarded to the distinction [94]. The
middle relay knows that the message is forwarded to the exit relay, but cannot
say who is sending the message.
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Tor client routes incoming and outgoing traffic through a shifting and multi-
hop circuit of relays. The main goal of designing such system is to make the
job of eavesdropping adversary much more challenging by anonymizing who is
communicating with whom and exchanged traffic. Tor system works only at the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) stream level and it can be used by any
application that supports SOCKS such as web browsers. Therefore, the web
browsers can be configured to direct their traffic through Tor SOCKS interface
[65, 94]. A strongest feature of Tor is that it masks its traffic to look like HTTPS
normal traffic which makes Tor traffic more difficult to be identified as it is shown
in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Tor session is decoded as it was normal HTTPS session.
Tor often establishes a connection over TCP 443 which follows spec (RFC
2246) of Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol so most packets inspectors fail
at identifying Tor traffic [42]. In our experiments we successfully filter and inspect
Tor traffic using several statical analysis methods as explained later in empirical
evaluation chapter. In this chapter did not go deep into Tor anonymity system
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as it is not the main focus of our research so more details about Tor design are
given in [32].
2.3 Website fingerpinting attacks on Tor
There are few proposed papers in website fingerprinting attack over Tor all of
them are relatively recent. The early techniques were focusing on analyzing the
encrypted HTTP traffic by extracting certain features from traffic pattern for
training traffic instances. Then, a classification mechanism is used to identify
testing traffic instances. In this section we outline the existing approaches in
website fingerprinting attacks.
The first author who refers to the process of identifying websites under en-
crypted connection as a term of ”fingerprinting” is Hintz [41]. He conducted a
simple website fingerprinting attack under encrypted traffic based on features ex-
tracted from website contents such as sizes and separate TCP connections. His
experiments are conducted on HTTP/1.0 version where each web content (e.g.
image, JS, text, etc) is fetched using a separate TCP connection. The results
show that his approach detects only 5 websites with an accuracy rate between 45
and 75 %. Later this approach becomes invalid with the presence of HTTP/1.1
version where the feature using TCP connections does not hold anymore.
Since Tor deployment in the late of 2003, few techniques have been proposed
for website fingerprinting attack on Tor protocol. Liberatore et al. in [49], pro-
posed two techniques for identifying the source of encrypted HTTP connections.
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They used only one feature for their experiments which is the packets sizes of
transmitted data under the cover of encrypted OpenSSH tunnels. Data mining
techniques like Jaccard’s coefficient and Naive Bayes (NB) classifiers are used
to classify the similarities between captured traffic and predefined fingerprints of
websites. The results of their experiments show that if IP packets are padded and
frequencies of packet lengths are considered, the NB classifier is more robust than
Jaccard’s classifier. They claim that their methods are quite effective in website
fingerprinting on a simple SSH tunnel with an accuracy of about 70 % in both
methods.
In [39] Herrmann et al. identify websites under popular encryption methods
using a text mining technique. They used Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB) clas-
sifier for training based on the frequency distributions of IP packet lengths. They
optimized their classifier by applying a set of text mining transformations so they
achieve a higher accuracy than previous work under comparable conditions. Their
experiments show an excellent accuracy of 96% against single-hop encryption sys-
tems (e.g. SSL, OpenSSH, etc), while they got less accuracy on multi-hop systems
(e.g. Tor and JAP) with an accuracy of 20% on JAP and 2.96% on Tor. This
gives a clear indication that website fingerprinting on Tor is more challenging than
other encrypting systems.
Shi et al. [69] proposed a novel method for website fingerprinting attack by
analyzing the traffic of a victim under Tor anonymity system. They divide both
the incoming and outgoing packets into several intervals and convert these in-
26
tervals into vectors. The similarities between observed vectors and predefined
fingerprints are calculated by a given formula. The practical and theoretical eval-
uations of their results show that their method is an effective way for degrading
the anonymity of users under Tor.
Panchenko et al. [61] came up with a website fingerprinting attack on Tor and
JAP anonymity systems using Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier. They
represented a traffic trace as a sequence of packet lengths where input and output
packets are distinguished using negative and positive values. In addition, they
injected some features in these sequences to raise the accuracy of the classifi-
cation such as size markers (whenever flow direction changes, insert the size of
packets in the interval), number markers (number of packets in every interval),
total transmitted bytes, etc. They used Weka tool [85] to fine-tune the SVM
parameters. They evaluated their method using Closed-world and Open-world
scenarios. In closed-world scenario they conducted their experiments on the same
data set of Federrath et al. [39] with 775 websites by estimating the accuracy
using a ten-fold cross validation. In open-world scenario, 5000 websites have been
chosen randomly among the top one million websites listed by Alexa [2]. Their
experimental results show that their approach improves the websites recognition
rates from 3% to 55% and in JAP and from 20% to 80% in Tor.
Cai et al. [15] proposed a new approach for achieving the highest accuracy than
previous works. They implemented string alignment using Damerau-Levenshtein
distance algorithm to compare the previously made fingerprints with the observed
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traffic based on the features of packets’ sizes and directions. They identified web
pages with an accuracy of 87.3% in closed-world model. They also classified
websites instead of individual web pages using Hidden Markov Models (HMMs).
They claim that the recent defenses against traffic analysis over Tor are not likely
to be successful.
The most recent contribution was by Wang and Goldberg [81] where they
proposed new techniques for website fingerprinting attack. They enhanced the
accuracy of Website fingerprinting by interpreting Tor data cells as units instead
of TCP/IP packet sizes and removing Tor SENDMEs cells that provide no useful
data in order to reduce the noise. They compared the similarity between the
predefined fingerprint instances and observed traffic instances using new optimal
string alignment distance metrics (OSAD) with limited computation resources.
The results of their closed-world experiments show that their methods achieve
better accuracy rate than previous works with 91%.
In our approach we conducted website fingerprinting attack using the most
commonly used web browsers so they differ in their accuracy rate as they have
different aspects (e.g. different rendering engines, various Java Script engines,
different HTML and APIs features). Therefore, we strongly believe that these
differences between tested browsers will affect the shape of their encrypted traffic
patterns as well as the accuracy rate of website fingerprinting attack on each
browser. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works have taken
into consideration the fact that Tor clients may use various web browsers over
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Tor, so that they share the same limitation in which they conducted the attack
on a single web browser (Firefox) while in ours we take into consideration the top
five web browsers. Not only that but we also investigated the root causes behind
different resistance levels of browsers while others are not.
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CHAPTER 3
COMMONLY USED WEB
BROWSERS
The web browser becomes a crucial piece of software in modern devices from mo-
bile phones to desktop computers. It is a client-side application and is considered
as the window for internet users to the World Wide Web (WWW), so this re-
quires a good performance, high quality, and solid reliability. The first graphical
web browser that makes the WWW accessible to everyone was Mosaic [6] which
was released in 1993. Later several web browsers (e.g. Internet Explorer, Firefox,
Opera, Safari, Chrome, etc) join the race making what is commonly referred as
(browsers war) and launch an information explosion that continues to this mo-
ment. With time, these browsers have become increasingly complex over the years,
not only to parse HTML and plain text, but also to render flash, images, videos
and other complex file formats and protocols. However, increasing complexity
of modern web browsers have brought too many security vulnerabilities which
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attract Malware authors and criminals to exploit these vulnerabilities to compro-
mise victims’ systems [57]. Currently, web users can use several web browsers to
browse the web expecting that browsing the web has consistent behavior across
different browsers. Unfortunately, this is often not the case so browsing the web
have differences which may range from minor differences to crucial functional flows
[56]. The different behaviors of browsers are due to many reasons such as various
web standards, accessibility tools, additional features and performance optimizing.
The fact that there is no published work that figure out different levels of browsers
resistances against traffic analysis attack. This indicates that the problem is more
challenging and complex due to the dynamic behavior of web environment which
is explained later. The main objective of this thesis is to investigate different
aspects of browsers’ behaviors in fetching different web objects (e.g HTML,JS ,
CSSs, image/x, etc) to find out to which extent each browser protects against
website fingerprinting attack providing that each browser allows configuring Tor
socket proxy. Therefore, in this chapter we give a detailed overview of the fac-
tors that affect the behavior of tested browsers (e.g. rendering/layout engines,
Java script engines, pipelining/parallel downloads, HTML and CSSs standards)
in order to reach the main differences that affect their various rates of privacy
protection.
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3.1 How web browsers work?
The main functionality of web browsers is to request web resources from web
servers and display them in their windows. The formats of requested resources
are usually HTML, image/x, JS, CSSs, etc. The main objects that the browser
uses to interpret and display other web contents are the Hyper Text Markup
Language (HTML) code and Cascading Style Sheets (CSSs) [71]. The HTML and
CSS are maintained by the web standards organization called World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) [80]. The latest versions for these two important web objects
are HTML 5 and CSSs 3 [34]. More details about HTML and CSSs are explained in
subsequent sections. The core differences behind web browsers are coming up from
their various rendering and Java Script engines which are reflected semantically
in various supports of browsers to different web technologies. The architecture
of browsers gives a clear view of how the main components of the browsers work
and how they interact with each other in order to display the requested objects
on their windows. A typical architecture of modern web browsers is presented
in Figure 3.1. It shows the main components that are used by most common
browsers.
Modern web browsers are fairly sophisticated applications comprised from sev-
eral components. The following items are the browsers components with their
main function:
 User interface (UI): It includes the main components of navigation controls
like address bar, bookmarking menu, etc.
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Figure 3.1: Browsers’ main components [34].
 Browser engine: It represents the internal interface of browsers to manipu-
late and query the rendering engine. It is the middle component between
the UI and the rendering engine.
 Rendering/Layout engine: The main function of this component is to parse
HTML code, request web objects, and show received contents on browser
window. It displays HTML, XML and images by default but in some
browsers other types of data requires certain types of plug-ins like PDF
viewer plug-in that displays PDF format.
 Networking: This is an independent interface that performs the network
calls like web objects requests.
 User interface (UI) backend: The main function of this unit is to draw basic
widgets windows like combo boxes. It is a generic interface that uses the
operating system user interface methods.
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 Java Script interpreter: Which is used to parse and execute JavaScript codes.
 Data storage/ Data persistence: This unit stores all sorts of requested data
on the hard disk like cookies.
3.2 Core differences between web browsers
The core reasons behind different behaviors of web browsers underlie in three main
sources. The first and most important one is the layout/rendering engine so it is
the primary source of browsers differences [20]. Its main functions are to render
and display web page objects in browser window by combining the structural
information of HTML and style information of CSSs. Each browser has its own
layout engine so it maintains the Document Object Model (DOM) that represents
fetched web page contents in a tree representation and manages the pipelining and
parallel downloads of website contents. DOM is a language-neutral platform that
allows scripts and programs to dynamically access and update its tree contents so
the result of this process is reflected to the presented web page contents. For more
details behind Document Object Model standard definition format see [79]. The
dynamism of web page elements comes from manipulating and modifying DOM
tree nodes by Java Script codes. Therefore, the same HTML/DOM and CSS for
the same web page can produce different view and traces in different browsers
based on their various JS APIs supports. More details behind layout engines are
presented in the subsequent section. The second source of browsers differences
comes from Java Script engine. Each browser has its own JS engine which results
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in differences in browsers behaviors [20]. Interactive web pages are enriched with
many Java Script programs that create dynamic web page contents. The details
of Java Script APIs and their impacts on browser behaviors are explained later.
The third source of a variety of browsers behavior is the user interaction (e.g.,
mouse click, drag and drop, mouse hover, etc). User actions perform changes in
the DOM based on the DOM-APIs of the browsers which have different supports
across browsers. In the next sections we explain the details behind the main
sources of different traffic patterns of browsers neglecting the source caused by
user interaction as the scope of our research is to test the behavior of the browser
itself.
3.2.1 Web browsers’ rendering/layout engines
The web developers tray to build web pages to be compatible with different
browsers because the people all around the world use various web browsers. Each
browser has its own rendering engine to draw HTML and CSS website contents,
thus each browser renders each website differently. Wikipedia defines the lay-
out/rendering engine as ”a software component that takes marked up content
(such as HTML, XML,image files, etc.) and formatting information (such as
CSS, XSL, etc.) and displays the formatted content on the screen. It draws on
the content area of a window, which is displayed on a monitor or a printer” [7].
When we look at a displayed web page on different web browsers, we notice that
there are not major inconsistencies in observed screen but when it comes to trace
35
level ”traffic pattern” we observe different traffic patterns as it is validated in
empirical evaluation chapter. The rendering engine is the main component of a
browser and it explicitly decides how to turn HTML, stylesheets, and scripts into
a vibrant web page. Each rendering/layout engine behaves differently according
to how it was programmed so it has everything to do with how web pages are
generated and visualized [12]. The rendering engine does most of the work of
website retrieval as it interacts directly with networking interface, JS interpreter,
and UI backend component. Table 3.1 shows the most popular rendering engines
used by tested web browsers.
Rendering/Layout engine Browser
Blink Chrome 31.0
Gecko Firefox 26.0
Trident Internet Explorer 10
WebKit Safari 5.1
Presto Opera 12.0
Table 3.1: The recent rendering/layout engines used by tested web browsers.
When a rendering engine parses HTML code, it calls networking layer by
sending several requests to web server in order to retrieve included web page
objects. Then, it gets the responded flow contents of requested objects as it is
shown in Figure 3.2.
The figure shows the gradual processes of browser rendering engines for inter-
preting HTML code and displaying fetched web contents on the screen. First, the
HTML tags is parsed and turned to Document Object Model (DOM) tree. Then,
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Figure 3.2: Basic flow of browser rendering engines [34].
another render tree is built with visual attributes, dimensions, and colors specified
by CSSs and visual instructions of HTML document. After that, the constructed
render tree is passed through layout process to give each node its coordinates in
order to be displayed in its prober position of browser window. The final step is
painting the render tree nodes using UI backend component [34]. In our study we
formulate the differences between browser rendering engines in terms of their sup-
port to various web features that affect browsers’ trace level rather than internal
presentation level because our focus is traffic analysis topic. More details on web
technologies that affect the shape of web browsers’ traffic patterns are explained
later in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Web browsers’ JavaScript engines
Unlike static web pages that contain plain HTML document and static objects,
dynamic web pages enrich with interactive web contents. These contents do many
tasks such as an interaction between web page and users, control web browser
and alter web page contents which make web pages more like an application. To
build animated/flashy web pages, Java Script language is introduced for improving
the user interaction experience so it is a very widely used language on the web
today. JavaScript commands run automatically in web browsers to add different
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functionalities to web pages. Brendan Eich designed JS language in 1995 to allow
non-programmers to extend web sites with client-side executable code [68]. It is an
interpreted language with Object Oriented (OO) capabilities which used mostly
by web browsers [100]. It has been standardized recently by European Computer
Manufacturers Association (ECMA) [58]. Furthermore, it is used by 97 out of 100
most popular websites worldwide [2].
Similar to rendering engine a Java Script engine is a key component of all major
web browsers and each browser has its own Java Script engine enrich with its own
features support. It is a process virtual machine for interpreting and executing JS
codes that are embedded in a web page. Each major browser supports JS code
in order to allow client-side scripting and dynamic web pages. JS code is loaded
and executed in browser side so it has a great impact in overall performance and
functionality of web browsers. The differences in functionalities introduced by web
pages are often due to various APIs JS supports employed by different browsers
[21]. Table 3.2 shows the embedded JavaScript engines corresponded to their web
browsers.
Java Script Interpreter/engine Browser
V8 Chrome 31.0
Spidermonkey Firefox 26.0
Chakra Internet Explorer 10
Nitro/SquirrelFish Safari 5.1
Carakan Opera 12.0
Table 3.2: The recent JavaScript engines used by tested web browsers.
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However, when a web browser loads a web page, an embedded JS code is
interpreted and executed by browser JavaScript interpreter/engine. The executed
JS codes can access a set of available Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
allowing them to do many tasks such as interacting with web page elements using
”DOM APIs”, accessing local browser data ”cookies”, communicating to remote
servers using several communication APIs, and manipulating other browser events
[10]. Therefore, we hypothesize that various browsers supports to JS generate
different traffic patterns of browsers.
A typical JS engine contains three embedded components that execute JS
codes. First, the source code is analyzed to construct a syntax tree ,that represents
the flow of the code, by parser component. Next, the syntax tree is interpreted to
execute the code by interpreter component. Finally, the run-time module provides
JS engine with different standard objects (e.g. Array, String, Math, etc) [40]. The
execution of JS codes have a great impact on both the rendering of a web page
and the traffic pattern of web browsers, because the components of JS engine are
often tied and interacted to its corresponding rendering engine [60]. Thus, Java
Script has been used by many researchers and attackers to manipulate the pattern
of the traffic for fingerprinting purposes. For example, Abbott et al. injected java
script to be executed on browser side in order to change its traffic pattern as a
signal that can be detected and associated for browser-based attacks on Tor [1].
Figure 3.3 shows possible interactions that Java Script behaves when browsing
the web which has an impact on whole traffic pattern.
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Figure 3.3: The interactions between Java Script ,that is executed on browser,
and web page server.
A JavaScript web application is the essence of HTML page which is associated
with other resources (like CCSs, image files, etc). JS codes execution is driven
by events in web browsers like timeouts occur. Most real time JS programs are
embedded in the context of HTML page. When they are executed in browsers,
they change the HTML DOM and access browsers’ APIs which cause consider-
able challenges to the analysis and control of web browsing data [68]. JS has been
used by large fraction of all websites which allow web applications to be more
interesting, dynamic, and responsiveness. Unfortunately, these advantages of JS
come with a lot of security problems that attract the attention of academicians
and researchers to take care of. It has been discovered that there are a lot of at-
tacks that exploit the JS dynamism (e.g., accessing and modifying shared objects,
injecting malicious codes, etc). As a result, several researchers [96], [76], [51], [38],
and [22] have beeb proposed with various approaches, to monitor and prevent JS
related attacks.
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Browser’s Java script engine is invoked from JS code embedded within HTML
documents in five primary ways [98]:
 Standalone < SCRIPT > tags that enclose JS code block and running
dynamically during HTML code parsing
 External/remote JS codes < SCRIPTSRC = ”...” > which are executed
based on the security context of relevant browser
 CSS Style-sheet expression(...) block that authorizes JS syntax in some
browsers
 Certain URL links that are specified as target for certain JS actions
 Event handlers that are attached to HTML tags such as mouse hover
In our research we take into consideration both: first and second methods that
are relevant to browser dependent actions. When JS code is called by JS engine,
it has full access to DOM. The executed JS may also further invoke new JS by
calling eval(), producing JS-invoking HTML, or configuring timers (e.g. setTime-
out and setInterval) [46]. Moreover, at run time, new HTML elements can be
created dynamically so each HTML element rises a range of JavaScript objects.
Executed JS has various interactions with same-origin document data (e.g. draw-
ing CANVASes, displaying pop-up dialog, etc). In this research we neglect JS
actions that change the page look and we focus more on JS actions that have an
impact on the shape of traffic pattern ”level trace” as our interest is traffic analysis
attack. When executing remote/external JS (e.g. < SCRIPTSRC = ”...” >, or
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< LINKREL = ”Stylesheet”HREF = ”...” >), they might send requests and
read responses even across domains violating Same Origin Policy(SOP). Further-
more, they may send information to third party servers by spawning objects (e.g.
< IMG >,< IFRAME >,< APPLET >, etc) and read back the returned data
[98]. The external interactions of JS depend on security policies and features sup-
ports introduced by associated browser. For example, the browser that sits more
restrictions on the interaction with third-party domains, it prevents loading and
executing of possible malicious JS codes that may happen like cross-site scripting
(XSS) as it is shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Possible scenario of XSS attack
However, it has been noted in a Benchmarking of Modern Web Browsers [4]
that JavaScript and related technologies demands have increased on browsers
rather than servers which of course will result of different behaviors of web
browsers. A number of studies on [97] show that there are a number of users
who disable scripting languages in their browsers for security reasons which re-
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sults in different browser compatibilities toward several web services. Moreover,
web browsers ,that is configured to use Tor system, executes the JavaScript code
through Tor circuit and the browser still anonymous [1]. Therefore, Java Scripts
in our research are enabled as we conducted all our experiments in default modes
of tested web browsers.
3.2.3 Important web contents and web technology features
Popular websites vendors design their websites for maximum compatibilities of
browsers so that the web pages are rendered correctly on modern web browsers
such as Chrome, FF, IE, etc. In order to understand how a web page is loaded
on different combinations of browsers, we need to investigate different features
of web page contents that are browser-dependent. There are three main objects
that make a web page look and behave differently across browsers which are:
HTML defines web page contents and markups, CSS defines the appearance, and
JavaScript defines the behavior. In this section we will discuss these important
contents and focus more on web technologies the that affect the traffic pattern
shapes of browsers.
First, Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) is a markup language that de-
scribes the structure and content of a document by tagging and identifying differ-
ent elements embedded in the document (e.g. text, images, JS, etc)[54]. It forms
the building blocks of all web pages and can be used to create interactive forms
[89]. In the early years of HTML language, web developers were free to design
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web pages in the way they want so there wasn’t any organization responsible for
standardizing the language. As a result, this created too many incompatibilities
between different browsers as well as making a big challenge for web developers
to write HTML code that satisfies various browsers and even different versions of
the same browser. To solve this issue a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [80]
was created by a group of web developers and programmers in order to set spec-
ifications and standards to be followed by all browsers’ makers. W3C maintains
the specifications of HTML, CSS , and other web-related standards such as web
content accessibility guidelines (WCAG) and scalable vector graphics (SVG) [43].
Although browsers’ vendors use the recommended rules and guidelines of W3C
specifications, they can interpret these rules as required for their own purposes.
However, in our experimental work we relay on W3C standards for testing and
validating a lot of features that cause different traffic pattern of tested browsers.
Many HTML versions [54] have been developed over the past years. The W3C
develops HTML5 specification as a recent standard for the next generation of
HTML. With the present of this new HTML standard, old versions of HTML
standards are neglected by both web page owners and browsers manufacturers.
Recently, all major browsers support the most recent HTML standards such as
HTML 4.01, XHTML 1.1 and HTML5 [43]. The latest iteration is HTML5 and
it includes many improvements to the existing features such as adding new fea-
tures and scripting-based APIs. The Application Programming Interface (API) is
considered as the same graphical interface for user but instead of being interface
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for human it is an interface for HTML code. It has been used by web developers
for years to be associated with HTML5 for improving a number of techniques
and put more power in developers’ hands to simplify a lot of tasks. Moreover,
it provides less dependence on plug-ins and third party software when browsing
rich media contents like introducing HTML5-based audio and video means. To-
day, web pages become much more complex referred as ”mashups” since there are
more contents and services are fetched among them from multiple sources called
third party domains. For example, some web pages present remote content from
a web page that is separated from original page called iframe. Browsers have
various security restrictions when they fetch web page contents from third party
domains so this has an impact on the retrieval behavior of that browsers. Figure
3.5 shows a web page that combines various web contents from different domains.
Figure 3.5: Common web contents that may be fetched from third party sites.
Source: http://bharathmarrivada. blogspot.com/2010/09/browser-wars-speed-
testperformance.html
Today, with the introduction of WEB 2.0, several web applications are ren-
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dered on websites from different domains in order to fulfill end user satisfaction
[52]. As a result, a high competition between different browsers’ vendors comes
up to adopt multiple features for providing web users with better performance
and rich functionality.
Web browsers makers have a security concern about malicious objects that
might be injected by third party side. Thus, they support their browsers with
different JavaScript security policies which of course have an impact to the shape
of the traffic. There are a lot of web services introduced on web pages which
depend on Java Script to be implemented such as HTML APIs that allow web
developers to design much richer and interactive web pages. But more security
concerns have come with the new functionality available to JavaScript programs
[10]. For brevity, from our deep survey about web browsers, we hypothesize that
there are important HTML APIs that may have an impact on the stability of
browsers’ traffic patterns which are discussed in subsequent sections.
Server-Sent Events(SSE): An API that provides real-time events which
allows the server that hosts a web page to communicate back to the browser
and updates a web page with some information from the server rather than re-
peatedly requesting it [93]. SSE was developed under HTML5 as a web pushing
technology for data transmission in time interval or any time from server appli-
cation to a browser that supports this API [87]. As a result, the browser that
supports this API its retrieved web page gets updates automatically from server
side and immediately appear on user screen (e.g. news feeds, stock price updates,
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Facebook/Twitter updates, etc) as a pushing scenario illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: A process mechanism of Server-Sent Event between supporting web
browser and a server.
The logic process of Server-Sent Event technique is shown in the figure where
a handshake request is sent from a browser that support SSE to supported server.
Then, a server system responses with a handshake response as text/event-stream.
Finally, after the handshake committed between the browser and SSE service, the
SSE service may send any amount of data at any time during a connection session
[87]. However, SSE is handled directly by web browser and the user who browse
the web using such supporting browser simply has to listen for coming messages
from server side . More details behind Server-Sent Events API are given in [9].
Content Security Policy (CSP): The home page or root page of a
website provides several links to second party HTML pages so it turns links to
third party HTML pages and so on and so forth as it is shown in Figure 3.7.
A browser ,that trusts and fetches all stuff of a retrieved web page as being
legitimately part of web page security region, could has a severe problem. This is
because some possible attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) bypass the same
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Figure 3.7: Accessing multi level/linked web pages over the web [45].
origin policy by tricking a web page into delivering malicious code into users along
with the intended content. To solve such possible vulnerabilities, W3C proposed
an important technique called Content Security Policy (CSP) [78]. This policy is
implemented by a web page author which contains a list of domains for specifying
from where the remote contents (e.g. scripts, CSSs, media, HTML frames etc) can
be loaded and executed on a designed web page. It provides a standard HTTP
header that allows web page authors to declare approved web contents that the
browsers should be permitted to load on a fetched web page [90]. Therefore, CSP
defense can significantly mitigates the risks and attacks that can be associated
with fetched contents by whit-listing trusted sources of web page contents.
Sandbox Attribute For ”iframes”: Frame is a web feature that allows
an HTML window to be splitted into segments each segment can show different
document [91]. The iframe is an element or HTML inline frame that represents
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a nested browsing context embedded within a retrieved web page. The remote
contents included in a retrieved web page are usually implemented by iframes that
separate those contents from the main page as it is clear in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: An inline iframe element embedded within the main web page.
Some web browsers allow various web contents from different domains to com-
municate with each other by implementing several APIs communications. An
iframe element might load un-trusted contents or run malicious behavior (e.g.
auto-playing video, plug-ins, and pop-ups) [88]. Consequently, a sandbox at-
tribute is proposed which is a property that sets extra restrictions on web stuff
that can appear in the inline frame [29]. So it restricts the actions of the iframe can
take rather than on the resources that the iframe can load. However, a browser,
that supports sandbox attribute, reduces possible risks that can be associated
with iframe contents loaded from third-party and prevents a clever attacker from
injecting malicious objects within fetched contents. It loads specific frame’s con-
tents in a low environment and allows only a subset of capabilities necessary to
run inline iframes [88].
The discussion of content or structure layer of rendered web page is done so now
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it is the time to discuss what makes it pretty using Cascading Style Sheets (CSS).
However, HTML marks various contents of the document, but it doesn’t indicate
how they are displayed. This is because the author of a web page doesn’t have
control on various devices and browsers that this web page will be displayed on.
Therefore, the exact appearance of web page elements are described in a separate
document called Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) [54]. CSS is the technology that
makes how web pages look like by giving a web browser a set of instructions
about the style of web page appearance (e.g. font sizes, colors, backgrounds,
etc). It is a style language that describes how HTML markups are styled and
presented so it describes the rendering of structured documents on various output
layouts (e.g. screen, paper, speech, etc) [43]. Therefore, various style sheets are
created by web developers to display their web page contents as they intent. The
recent version of style-sheet is CSS3 and it has several features (e.g. animation,
multiple backgrounds, transparency, specifying colors, etc). Each browser has
its own internal style sheets mechanism of specifying the way that different web
page elements appeared such as different font styles. For this reason, a web page
author creates a separate style sheet document that is embedded within HTML
document which specify the look of a web page depending on the version of a web
browser that is specified in client string of requested packets. Furthermore, the
author of a web page creates multiple style sheets which fit various output devices
(e.g. rendering on screen, printed output, and rendering aurally) [54]. However,
over time the task of figure out the differences between browsers has become more
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complicated because of the the large-scale usage of CSSs, the ongoing evolution
of HTML standards, and the continual addition of web technologies [60]. In
our research we formulate the differences between web browsers in terms of their
support for web features that will be reflected to their behavior on traffic pattern.
Table 3.3 shows the various web technologies that affect the trace patterns of
web browsers. The browsers support for these features are tested in the empirical
evaluation chapter.
Web technology Description
Asynchronous script execution [16] The script object has an async attribute that enables
the associated elements of script to be loaded and ex-
ecuted asynchronously with other objects of loaded
page. This web technique is a part of World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C) HTML specification so the
browser that supports this feature can download and
execute JavaScript objects with other web pages ele-
ment in parallel in order to increase the performance
of page-load significantly.
Navigation Timing API [44] It is a timing API to provide a browser with mea-
surements related to TCP connection establishment
and spent time for web pages loading. It can access
to timing information related to navigation and web
page elements.
ActiveX [62] Microsoft added ActiveX into Internet Explorer to
host ActiveX controls within web pages contents. It
allows certain web pages to automatically download
scripts, execute small applications, and embed anima-
tions in a web page such as banner ads. This makes
the retrieved web page richer but that is why IE is
more vulnerable to security threats.
Table 3.3: The web technologies that have an impact the web browsing traffic
pattern.
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The former sections demonstrated the importance of JavaScript, CSS, and
web technologies for creating highly interactive web pages. We will validate their
support and impact on browsers’ traffic patterns experimentally in the next chap-
ter. Furthermore, we will show how they make the resistances of browsers against
traffic analysis attack distinguishable from one another.
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CHAPTER 4
WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING
ATTACK
In this chapter, we detail and show the results of a number of experiments to as-
sess the efficiency and utility of our approach. Our empirical evaluation addresses
the following research questions:
RQ1: Are there different resistance levels of website fingerprinting attack con-
ducted by popular web browsers?
RQ2: Which browser protects web users’ privacy against website fingerprinting
attack more and which browser protects less?
RQ3: What are the root causes that stand behind various resistance levels of
browsers against website fingerprinting attack?
To answer and validate these research questions empirically, we follow the fol-
lowing evaluation methodology including the experimental setup, data collection,
applied method, results and analysis, and discussion.
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4.1 Experimental Setup
In order to investigate the protection range of browsers to the privacy of web
users over Tor, we have implemented a website fingerprinting attack. To do so, we
have collected the traffic traces and conducted several experiments using multiple
scripting codes and tools. The architectural framework for our experiments has
been set up using the software and hardware tools specified in Tables 4.1 and 4.2
below.
Tools Version
OS Windows 8
tshark 1.10.0 (SVN Rev 49790)
Google Chrome 31.0.1650.6
Firefox 26.0
Internet Explorer 10.0.9200.1638
Safari 5.1.7
Opera 12.16
Tor 3.5.2.1
Table 4.1: Software Tools.
Devices Specifications
CPU intel(R) Core(TM) Duo CPU T9600 @ 2.80 GHZ
Memory 4 GB
Ethernet Card Model 1EECD81C-907A-475B-ACF1-D106043C1F6D
Table 4.2: Specifications of hardware platform.
The communication backbone of the experiments is based on Ethernet en-
vironment of ADSL 3MB. We believe that the distinction between the retrieval
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behaviors of browsers is difficult, since there are many factors that may affect
the shape of their traffic patterns (e.g. the content and structure of the retrieved
web pages, browser configuration, the configuration of client hardware, and net-
work conditions). Therefore, we designed and conducted our experiments in a
controlled environment in order to focus on browser-dependent factors that affect
the retrieval behavior of browsers by eliminating external factors as they will be
explained later. The experiments have been conducted on the latest stable and
available version of web browsers with their default configuration without any
installed add-ons/extensions to make sure that the observed results are browsers-
dependent. In order to evaluate the resistance levels of browsers against website
fingerprinting attack, we set up our attack platform as it is illustrated in Figure
4.1 scenario. Our attack passed through several phases to figure out the website
fingerprinting attack results on tested browsers.
The first phase is the data collection phase where we sniffed the encrypted data
trace of websites retrieved over the top five browsers based on the method specified
in Section 4.2. Second phase is the preprocessing phase where we conducted some
preprocessing steps on captured data set (e.g. remove noisy data, extract features,
etc) to be prepared for classification phase. The phases that our attack passed
through are explained in subsequent sections.
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Figure 4.1: The various phases and an overview of our web page fingerprinting
attack scenario over Tor.
4.2 Data collection and Preprocessing Phases
Tor anonymous system is a live network with millions of daily users [64] who may
have entirely different browsers. Previous researches in website fingerprinting at-
tacks generally did not consider websites fingerprinting on different web browsers.
In this section we demonstrate how we sniffed/collected Tor anonymous data traf-
fic on the most commonly used web browsers for comparing different protections
of tested browsers against traffic analysis attack (website fingerprinting attack).
In order to create fingerprints of websites, we first established Tor network connec-
tion and configured web browsers to use Tor proxy with its default configuration
so all HTTP traffic is tunneled through default configuration of Tor. We inves-
tigated the effectiveness of our fingerprinting approach on the main pages of the
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top 20 most visited websites ranked by Alexa statistics [2]. We selected these
websites/dataset because of their global popularity as well as their representative
to diverse activities on the WWW such as e-commerce (amazon and ebay), search
engines (google and ask), social networking (facebook and twitter), etc. The
data-set of our experiments were collected during Feb. 2014 under a closed-world
scenario. In such scenario, the attacker creates fingerprints for a list of websites
so when a victim visits certain website from a list of predefined/fingerprinted
websites, the attacker observes the victim’s trace pattern and matches it with
the list of previously fingerprinted websites in order to guess which website that
the victim visits for the sake of testing browsers protection. To automate the
browsing of websites, we wrote a python code to simulate a typical user action
like typing a URL into the address bar of the browsers. It automates each web
browser for browsing the list of 20 websites so each browser visits each website
15 times in a round-robin fashion. During the web browsing visits, we scripted
tshark, the command-line version of WireShark traffic analyzer, to capture the
real traffic packets of each visited website to be recorded in trace/log files un-
der each browser. Each trace/log file is labeled with the browser name, visited
web page, and the number of visit for further analysis. We recorded 15 log files
(packets traces) for each loaded website in the list. We repeated the automation
of websites visits on each browser and removed its cache after each website visit.
Through browsing automation process, we sat 25 seconds as a time out for each
loaded page to assure the loading of each website completely as well as for the
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sake of consistency between tested browsers. We ended up with 1500 log trace
files for the five browsers, with (20 web pages ∗ 15 visits) per each browser. Each
trace file contains the data traffic of its visited web page (e.g. the time of sent and
received packets, the sizes of packets, the order in which the packets were sent or
received, etc). Table 4.3 lists the top 20 websites that we used for our study.
Websites’ Data Set
1 http://www.google.com 2 http://www.facebook.com
3 http://www.youtube.com 4 http://www.yahoo.com
5 http://www.baidu.com 6 http://www.en.wikipedia.org
7 http://www.ebay.com 8 http://www.live.com
9 http://www.taobao.com 10 http://www.linkedin.com
11 http://www.sina.com.cn 12 http://www.twitter.com
13 http://www.amazon.com 14 http://www.hao123.com
15 http://www.google.co.in 16 http://www.blogspot.com
17 http://www.weibo.com 18 http://www.tmall.com
19 http://www.wordpress.com 20 http://www.ask.com
Table 4.3: List of used websites for investigating the resistance levels of browsers
to website fingerprinting attack.
To prepare the data for classification phase, we did some preprocessing steps:
we removed TCP control packets (Acks and Syncs) because they reduce the per-
formance of the system and don’t add useful information in classification phase.
Moreover, we filtered only Tor packets from other non-Tor packets that might cap-
tured during traffic sniffing. Then, we extracted certain features from collected
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traces to create a profile for each visited web page which called ”Fingerprint”. To
extract the features for classification, we built scripting program to extract the
sizes and the directions of retrieved packets that represent web pages fingerprints.
The traffic packets are stored as integers in the observed direction and recorded
as positive for outgoing packets and negative for incoming ones (e.g. 1150, −52,
1500, −638, 52, and 638 bytes). We have selected these packets features because
they reveal information about the sizes of referenced packets by a web page and
the order in which the browser issues or retrieve them.
4.3 Classification of web browsers resistances
In classification phase, the profile/trace of each website is represented as fin-
gerprint stored as a sequence of positive and negative integers. These integers
represent the sizes and directions of TCP packets generated to load website con-
tents over Tor. Then, the website traces/fingerprints are classified using Cai et
al. method described in [15]. So we calculated the similarity between websites
fingerprints using Damerau-Levenshtein distance algorithm. It figures out the
similarity between websites fingerprints by calculating the number of operations
(insertion, deletion, substitution, and transposition) that are required to transfer
trace t= (−1150, 1500, −638, 638, etc) into trace t’ = (−638, −1150, 638, 1500,
etc). Thus, the minimum number of operations to transfer trace t into trace t’ is
the more similar they are to each other so they are considered as two visits from
the same website. After the similarity distances between websites fingerprints are
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calculated, they are classified using Support Vector Machine. As a result, we got
the different recognition rates of websites under tested browsers. Figure 4.2 shows
our fingerprinting results over tested browsers. It gives an overview of different
resistance levels of browsers against website fingerprinting attack.
Figure 4.2: The resistance rate of web browsers against website fingerprinting
attack over Tor.
Our metric in this study is the success rate of identifying websites fingerprints
or the percentage achieved to guess the identity of a website that the victim visits
correctly over popular browsers. Figure 4.2 shows the different recognition rates
of websites fingerprints that we achieved over tested browsers. The highest recog-
nition rate achieved by a browser is the least privacy protection that this browser
introduces, while the lowest recognition rate achieved by a browser is the high-
est protection it introduces against website fingerprinting attack. So the highest
recognition rate is 74% that is achieved by IE which indicates that it has the least
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protection against website fingerprinting attack so the shape of its traffic pattern
can be monitored with the highest accuracy rate compared to other browsers. On
the other hand, the lowest recognition rate is achieved by Opera of 41.6% followed
by Safari of 53.8% which indicate that the surveillance of their traffic patterns by
attackers is more difficult so they protect more against website fingerprinting at-
tack compared to other browsers. The recognition results of Firefox and Chrome
are 70.4% and 69.6% respectively. However, the root causes behind these various
resistance levels of browsers against website fingerprinting attack are explained in
details in the subsequent sections.
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CHAPTER 5
4. ROOT CAUSES BEHIND
DIFFERENT RESISTANCE
LEVELS OF BROWSERS
After we detected various recognition rates of browsers in website fingerprinting
attack, we figured out the main reasons behind various website fingerprinting re-
sults on Tor anonymous system. In this chapter we investigate the root causes of
different resistance levels of browsers against website fingerprinting attack. How-
ever, the differences between web browsers span a wide range of features from
visual/look level to traffic/trace level. These variations are caused by various
functionalities that are supported by different browsers. Our approach doesn’t
target internal browsers differences that don’t have an impact on the shape of their
traffic patterns such as DOM manipulation, but it targets the browser-dependent
features that affect the shape of its traffic pattern (e.g. JavaScripts, third-party
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ads domains, performance optimization, parallel downloads, etc). Because the
web browsing traffic under Tor is anonymous/encrypted so we can’t see packets
data and their related information fields. Furthermore, we can’t observe the be-
havior of browsers on retrieving different web browsing contents. Therefore, we
turned off Tor then we carried out deep analytical study on web browsing traffic
by sufficient drill down to web pages contents level. We have done the experi-
ments on the same platform and data-set of previous experiments but on normal
traffic instead of anonymous/encrypted traffic. In this section we conducted sev-
eral fine-grained tests on browsers-dependent features and their impacts on web
browsing contents to catch the main causes that they make browsers behave dif-
ferently. The experiments are conducted based on the stable versions of browsers,
no add-ons/extensions, and without any external programs that may affect the
dependent behavior of tested browsers.
5.1 Browsers’ web technology features
Each web browser has its own associated features and traffic pattern, which make
it distinguishable from other browsers. To find out the main causes behind dif-
ferent behaviors of web browsers which resulted in various accuracies of website
fingerprinting attack, we have done several experiments to test browsers’ differ-
ences in both: their support to various web technology features and the reflection
of these features to their behavior in retrieving various web contents. We started
by testing the support of browsers to various web technologies that have an im-
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pact on the shape of their traffic patterns using a couple of standard tools and
scripts [35], [26], and [36]. Table 5.1 shows the results of web technologies that we
compare tested browsers against. It shows the various supports of tested browsers
to popular web technologies. The sign (
√
) indicates that the browser supports the
associated feature while the sign (×) indicates that the browser doesn’t support
the associated feature.
Features Chrome FF IE Safari Opera
CSS Filter Effects
√ × × × ×
Asynchronous script execution
√ √ √ √ ×
Navigation Timing API
√ √ √ × ×
ActiveX × × √ × ×
Native Flash blocking × × × × √
Cached compiled programs × × × × √
Table 5.1: Web technologies that affect the shape of traffic patterns of web
browsers.
We selected these features as a significant metric for browsers investigation as
they have a great impact on their traffic patterns. The main functionality of these
features and their impact on web browsing traffic patterns are explained in the
subsequent sections.
The ”Asynchronous script execution” feature [16] allows the JavaScript to be
loaded and executed asynchronously with other objects of a loaded page. So
the Opera browser that doesn’t support this feature, block all other downloads
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when it retrieves and executes JavaScript file. Therefore, this behavior has a
great impact on the sequence order of retrieved objects and the performance of
page-load significantly as it is shown in results of section 5.2.3.
The ”Navigation Timing API” feature [44] provides a browser with accurate
measurements related to the establishment of TCP connection and the spent time
for web pages contents retrieval. It can also access to timing information related
to navigation and web page elements. Thus, Opera and Safari don’t support this
timing feature which has an impact on their traffic patterns as it is investigated
in section 5.2.3.
ActiveX feature [62] is supported by Microsoft in its Internet Explorer browser.
It hosts ActiveX controls within web pages contents. So it allows certain web
pages to automatically download scripts, execute small applications, and embed
animations in web pages such as banner ads. This allows a rich retrieval of web
pages contents but our attack shows that the highest recognition rate is achieved
under IE because of its behavior in allowing rich contents to be retrieved which
make its traffic pattern the most distinguishable than other browsers as it is shown
in the results of next sections. Native Flash blocking feature that is supported by
Opera browser which blocks flash animation contents as a result its traffic pattern
is affected as it is shown in the results. Furthermore, the ”Cached compiled
programs” feature that is supported by Opera which allows it to cache JS libraries
in its internal cache to be used again in JS contents retrieval without reloading.
Therefore, these features affect the browser-side footprint heavily when re-
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trieving rich-contents of websites. Moreover, web technologies (e.g. ads filtering,
Flash blocking, third-party domains’ restrictions, etc) affect also the traffic pat-
terns of browsers in various levels based on their support by browser. The various
browser-dependent features and their impact on the retrieval behavior of various
web contents that are investigated in the subsequent sections.
5.2 The impact of browsers-dependent features
on their web browsing traffic patterns
When a browser sends an HTML request, the corresponding server handles the
request and delivers an HTML document to the browser. Then, the rendering
engine of the browser parses HTML doc so the embedded objects within HTML
code (e.g., images, JSs, flashes, etc) are fetched from their referenced servers. Each
web page has its own fingerprint in a term of number of various web objects. Each
browser retrieves website contents differently based on its support to different
web technology features so each browser has its own website fingerprint. The
characterization of browser features essentially involves the characterization of
various website objects (e.g. application/JavaScript, application/x-shockwave-
flash, etc) retrieved by a corresponding browser. Therefore, we have matched each
browser feature mentioned above with its relevant behavior in websites retrieval
to see its impact on browsers traffic pattern. We have done many tests to reach
the main causes behind web browsers that influence their traffic/trace patterns
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so we have proved their impact experimentally as it is shown in the subsequent
sections.
We conducted a deep traffic analysis and aggregated analytics on real browsing
data (number of retrieved resources, content types, and other metadata) of our
fingerprinting data-set that posted in Table 4.3. All possible web content-types
that we have analyzed are posted in Table 5.2 below.
Various web pages content-types
1 text/html 2 text/css
3 text/javascript 4 text/plain
5 application/x-javascript 6 application/javascript
7 application/x-chrome-extension 8 application/json
9 application/x-shockwave-flash 10 application/x-www-form-urlencoded
11 application/ocsp-response 12 application/ocsp-request
13 application/octet-stream 14 application/x509-ca-cert
15 image/x-icon 16 image/png
17 image/webp 18 image/jpeg
Table 5.2: List of all possible web browsing content-types that we analyzed on
Web pages’ Data Set.
Thus, after we did extensive analysis on all retrieved web contents-types, we
figured out the contents-types that draw a certain traffic pattern for each browser.
From analyzed data we have characterized web browsing traffic to a number of
metrics. In this section we demonstrate some interesting metrics that are cor-
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related to different browsers-dependent features which affect the shape of their
traffic patterns. The experimental results in Table 5.3 are conducted by several
statical analysis tests on our data-set which will be explained in details in the
subsequent sections.
Browser Name Average
JS data
flow[KB]
Number of
empty files
Average
No. third-
party
domains
Average
loading
time [Sec.]
Chrome 6845.692 23 533 27.426
Firefox 9127.72 21 493 28.394
Internet Explorer 14855.82 24 603 29.298
Safari 4172.84 22 434 19.322
Opera 517.44 67 0 12.028
Table 5.3: Characterizing traffic characteristics generated by tested web browsers.
From our experiments, we observed that each browser exhibits different pattern
on the same browsing data set. This is because each browser retrieves web pages
contents differently based on its support to various web technologies. Below are
the web content results that exhibit the variations on traffic patterns of different
browsers.
5.2.1 The impact of JavaScripts on web browsers’ traffic
patterns
JavaScript is enabled by default on all major browsers, and it was reported by
Alexa that 98 out of 100 popular websites use JavaScript [84]. Furthermore,
Michael et al. proved that JavaScript contents occupy the fraction of 25% across
all downloaded web contents [13]. Therefore, we started to analyze the behavior
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of tested browsers on this large portion of web browsing content. Each browser
has its own JavaScript interpreter so it behaves differently in executing JavaScript
programs and it can access a set of available APIs implemented by its browser.
JavaScript code is loaded and executed on browser side so there are APIs that
JavaScripts deal with allow the scripts to communicate with remote servers [10].As
a result, loading and executing JavaScript contents have a great impact on the
shape of browsers’ traffic patterns. Our results show that different browsers’
JavaScript engines load and execute various amounts of JavaScript data as it is
shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: The various amount of JS data flow which reflects the different be-
haviors of browsers’ JavaScript engines.
Animation on web pages is the characteristic of JavaScript behavior so the
more JS data flow in website retrieval is the larger the chance of website finger-
print/identity to be identified uniquely. As it is clear in the experimental results in
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Figure 5.1 that IE has the largest amount of JS data flow of 14855.82 KB followed
by FF of 9127.72 KB and Chrome of 6845.692 KB. On the other hand, the least
amount of JS data is fetched by Opera of 517.44 KB followed by Safari of 4172.84
KB. During the experiments we noticed that the different supports of browsers to
various web features create different JS data flow illustrated in Figure 5.1. The
results show that IE has the largest amount of JS data flow. This is because
Microsoft provides its IE browser with the distinctive feature called (ActiveX) to
host ActiveX controls within websites contents. Thus, it allows certain web pages
to automatically execute small applications and download scripts/animations in
order to enhance user browsing experience. Moreover, IE allows all flash anima-
tion contents that are created by JavaScript Flash language (JSFL) to be loaded
as it is integrated with Adobe Flash by default. This makes retrieved websites
by IE more richer but rises possible security vulnerabilities especially the recog-
nition rate of website fingerprinting attack as we got in our experimental results
shown in Figure 4.2. So the websites fingerprints on IE are distinguished with
the highest recognition rate of 74% compared to other browsers. The behavior
of FF and Chrome in JS data flow is also reflected directly on their recognition
rate of 70.40% for FF and 69.60% for Chrome. They are approximately with the
same resistance level to website fingerprinting as they share the same security
mechanism called ”Safe Browsing” [37] that blocks all suspected JSs in order to
provide more phishing and malware protection. Safari deals with less JS data flow
because Apple maintains an updated blacklist for malicious JSs and Flashes so
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that Safari blocks versions of JS and Flashes provided by certain websites which
place it on the second least recognition rate of website fingerprinting with 53.80%.
The least JS data flow is rendered by Opera. The reason behind is that Carakan
[47],the JS engine of Opera, brings an internal caching for compiled JS programs
so this technique is quite effective feature in typical scenario where the same JS
libraries can be reused internally without reloading it again such as a very large
JS library. Furthermore, Opera has a Flash blocking feature so these features
affect the traffic pattern of Opera and make it with the least recognition rate in
website fingerprinting attack of 41.60% as it is shown in Figure 4. However, the
results show that JS behaviors of browsers have relevant impacts on their various
resistances against website fingerprinting attack.
5.2.2 The impact of third-party loaded contents on traffic
patterns of browsers
With the development of the web and fast growing of on-line business, the web
sites appeared to be as a mixed of various web services provided from multiple
sources [86]. In our traffic analysis tests, we found that there are a lot of web
contents retrieved from different origins shown in Figure 5.2. These contents are
collected from third-party servers that are correlated to the traffic of target/first-
party server. For example, the visited web page can host several services: ad-
vertisement services from popular third-party ads servers (e.g. googleadservices
and doubleclick), analytical services that track user activity (e.g. quantserve and
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google-analytics), and feed with contents from content distribution networks (e.g.
Limelight and Akamai). Therefore, the amount of data traffic coming from third-
party servers comprise a considerable fraction of retrieved data which have an
impact on web browsing traffic patterns of browsers. The results in Figure 5.2
shows that different numbers of third-party servers are contacted by browsers
that allow various amount of services to be retrieved based on the variety of their
security policies.
Figure 5.2: The various number of third-party servers retrieved by web browsers
which affect their web browsing traffic patterns.
The browser, that allows all data coming from third-party servers, brings a
high-value in its traffic pattern. As it is shown in Figure 5.2, that IE has the
highest portion of the number of 603 contacted third-party servers. This is because
IE allows all flash Ads contents to be loaded from third-party servers as we stated
earlier that Adobe Flash is integrated by default with IE so it doesn’t restrict
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flash ads coming from third-party servers. That is why IE the largest target to
attackers who exploit any security vulnerabilities behind IE behavior. This factor
affects the recognition rate of IE on website fingerprinting attack. This is clear in
IE browser so while it has the highest number of retrieved third-party websites, it
also has the highest recognition rate of website fingerprinting attack of 74% which
means it has the least privacy protection compared to other browsers. Chrome
filters pop-up ads while FF has sandbox security model to limit accessing data
from other websites/third-party websites based on Same-Origin Policy (SOP) as
it is shown in Figure 5.2 that Chrome retrieves web contents from 533 third-
party servers followed by FF from 493. Safari retrieves stuff from 434 third-party
services as it blocks third-party cookies so the third-party websites that require
cookie to be enabled will be restricted. We noticed that Opera browser blocks all
data coming from third-party websites as it has strong security restrictions such
as Pop-ups blocking and cookie disabling for the sake of more security perspective.
So Opera browser blocks all third-party domains so it has the least recognition
rate of website fingerprinting attack of 41.60% which means it has the highest
privacy protection against website fingerprinting attack as it is shown in Figure
4.2. The results prove that the largest number of third-party domains retrieved
by a browser is the least privacy protection that this browser introduces. On the
other hand, the least number of third-party domains fetched by a browser is the
more privacy protection it has. We investigated the browsers’ content features
that affect the pattern of retrieved contents so the next subsections will evaluate
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browsers’ performance features that have a great impact in the consistency of
browsers’ website visits.
5.2.3 The impact of retrieval aspects of browsers on the
consistency of their traffic patterns
When a browser requests the URL visible in its address bar, the HTML document
is retrieved with its embedded sub-resources (e.g. images, scripts, style-sheets,
flashes, etc). However, requesting each element individually by establishing sep-
arated HTTP requests causes the retrieval process to be slow and accompanied
with much traffic of TCP Acks and Syncs. To eliminate these performance is-
sues a parallel download technique was proposed to optimize the retrieval time of
websites so all browsers are permitted to open several simultaneous connections to
load website contents in parallel.So the behavior of browsers in parallel downloads
and loading time management is the main source of variations in the consistent
order of packets as it is shown in Figure 5.3. In this section we evaluated the con-
sistency between browsers’ website visits/traces/fingerprints by visiting Amazon
website 5 times with each browser and took the Average and Standard Deviation.
However, the web browsers may differ in their strategies of how they paral-
lelize the retrieval of website contents and how they optimize the loading time.
Therefore, these two features have a great impact on the stability/consistency be-
tween the lengths of website fingerprints/traces which affect the recognition rate
of website fingerprinting on different browsers. In parallel downloads we observed
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Figure 5.3: The inconsistency between the sequence order of retrieved objects for
5 visits to the same website.
a significant parallel download issue which affect on the consistency of browser
traffic pattern extremely. The parallel download behavior of Opera differs from
other browsers because it doesn’t support || Script Image, || Script Stylesheet,
and Asyncronous script execution features explained in Table 3.3. Therefore,
when Opera retrieves an external script, it blocks all other downloads until the
script is loaded, parsed and executed. The waterfall chart in Figures 5.4 and 5.5
show the staircase pattern where there are some intervals of JSs that block Opera
from requesting website objects in parallel.
Thus, Opera does not support requesting JSs with other objects in parallel for
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Figure 5.4: The impact of JavaScripts blocking on web browsing traffic pattern of
Opera.
the sake of security concern so this parallel download issue has a great impact on
the stability of its traffic pattern. Therefore, the misbehaving behavior of Opera
that is caused by its parallel download makes its traffic patterns the most diversity
compared to other browsers as it is shown in Standard Deviation of its websites
visits in Figure 5.6. As a result, Opera has the least recognition rate in website
fingerprinting attack compared to other browsers as shown in Section 4.3, Figure
4.2.
Different browsers implement different logic of retrieval optimization such as
when the individual requests are dispatched so this will be reflected to the sta-
bility/consistancy between the lengths of websites visits/traces. However, the
recent implementation of the W3C Navigation Timing API specification [77] that
is supported by Chrome, FF and IE add a great performance optimization to their
retrieval time. What can’t be measured it can’t be optimized so the browser that
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Figure 5.5: The impact of JavaScripts blocking on web browsing traffic pattern of
Opera.
supports Navigation Timing feature, a major development will be added to its
functionalities. This feature provides browsers with fine-grained measurements
about real browsing timings such as (e.g. TCP connection, timing information
related to loaded elements, etc) further information behind this feature found in
[33]. The performance metrics supported by Navigation Timing optimize the re-
trieval behavior of browsers that support it which is reflected clearly to the shape
of their traffic patterns as it is illustrated in Figure 5.6. The results show that the
browsers have various average loading times and different inconsistencies between
the retrieval times of their website visits. We evaluated the consistency between
the retrieval periods of website visits by calculating the Standard Deviation of
several website visits.
Figure 5.6 shows that Opera and Safari have the largest Standard Deviation
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Figure 5.6: The variations in retrieval time of browsers and their impact on the
consistency of web browsing traffic patterns.
across browsers as they don’t support Navigation Timing feature. So the lack
of Opera and Safari to the efficiency of this timing feature is reflected to the
consistency of their website traces as it is shown in Figure 5.6. Furthermore, this
is reflected also to their accuracy on website fingerprinting attack as it is shown
in Figure 4.2. Beside the lack of Navigation Timing feature, Opera also has the
parallel download issue mentioned above. So Opera has the highest inconsistency
between the length of its website traces compared to other browsers because of
its largest Standard Deviation value shown in Figure 5.6 which means the largest
diversity between the lengths of its website traces/fingerprints. As a result, Opera
has the least recognition rate of website fingerprinting attack compared to other
browsers as it is shown in Figure 4.2.
The consistency between website traces on IE and FF is approximately the
same as they share the support of Asynchronous script execution and Navigation
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Timing features. For further information behind these features see Table 3.3. IE
has the most regularity between the lengths of its website traces so this behavior is
reflected to its resistance to traffic analysis attack where IE has the largest recog-
nition rate in website fingerprinting compared to other browsers as it is shown in
Figure 4.2. The consistency between website visits over Chrome is more diversity
than FF and IE. Although, they share the same features (Asynchronous script ex-
ecution and Navigation Timing) but we have noticed that in some website visits
Chrome downloads stuff from Google’s servers which are maintained periodically
(e.g. the most recent Safe Browsing list maintained by Google related to blacklist
of websites that Chrome must avoid and it is updated continuously, apps and
themes) in a form of ”application=x-chrome-extension” content-type. This be-
havior of Chrome is illustrated website retrieval in the most left part of Chrome
in waterfall chart in Figure 5.7. This behavior of Chrome makes its website visits
more inconsistency than FF and IE.
Figure 5.7: The automatic periodical loading of Chrome from Google’s servers.
The figure shows the automatic periodical updates of Chrome by Google which
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occur continually. This distinctive behavior of Chrome affect the website finger-
printing accuracy so these updates (e.g. Safe Browsing List and themes ”CSS
filters”) are triggered in some website visits randomly.
In website fingerprinting attack the consistency or inconsistency between web-
site fingerprints/log traces have a great impact on the accuracy of website finger-
printing attack. When it comes to the classification phase the similarity between
website fingerprints is calculated using Damerau-Levenshtein distance algorithm
as it is described in Section 4.3. So this algorithm depends on matching the
integers of the traces (-1150, 1500, - 638, 638, etc ) to calculate the similar-
ity between websites fingerprints. Therefore, the variations between the lengths
of traces/fingerprints has a great impact on the accuracy of website fingerprint-
ing.In data collection phase of our website fingerprinting attack we automated the
browsers for websites visits and we noticed that there are several number of web-
sites which were not visited by browsers so their log files were left empty. Figure
5.8 shows the various number of empty log files that are collected over browsers.
The characteristic of internet network is not stable as there are several network
problems that can be happened in any second either in communication medium or
server side such as DNS resolving, Server loading, etc. Because our attack is real
scenario so we left everything as it is by considering the empty log files to evaluate
the real browsing behavior of browsers. As it is shown in Figure 5.8 that there are
approximately 20 log files that are left empty under Chrome, FF, IE and Safari.
The sharing of the four browsers to this behavior indicate that it is caused by the
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Figure 5.8: The number of empty log files collected over browsers during data
collection phase which affect the website fingerprinting accuracy of browsers.
variation of internet network conditions. Opera has a distinctive number of 67
empty log traces so this is not comparable to other browsers which we collected
their log traces on the same platform conditions and same data set. The reason
is that the results show that Opera has two significant security features that are
enabled by default which stand behind the unique behavior of Opera. The screen
shots that are captured during the automated data collection of Opera are shown
in Figure 5.9.
As it is shown in the figure that the left screen shot presents the blocked cookie
of Opera which is disabled by default. Some websites doesn’t allow to be browsed
without the enabled cookie feature of the browser so those websites were not
visited and cause the empty log files of Opera. The right screen shot illustrates
the security certificate issue which is caused by strict security behavior of Opera
to verify trusted websites. The warning dialog shows a question about website
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Figure 5.9: The security features that caused the most empty log traces of Opera.
visit rejection or bypassing the certificate warning to visit a website which the
full security cannot be guaranteed. In this case there wasn’t not any response to
the warning dialog message trigged by Opera so the 25 seconds interval that we
set for each website visit was fired and the website wasn’t visited as a result the
log file trace left empty. To sum up, in this chapter we have conducted extensive
analysis tests to figure out the root causes that stand behind different resistance
levels of browsers against website fingerprinting attack. There are some external
factors that may affect the behavior of web browsers which will be discussed in
the subsequent sections.
5.3 Discussion
There is no any research in the literature that evaluates the behaviors and func-
tionalities of the most commonly used web browsers from traffic analysis perspec-
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tive. The traffic patterns of browsers may change due to some network conditions
and dynamic behavior of server-side. The following subsections discuss the factors
that affect the recognition rate of web browsers in website fingerprinting attack.
5.3.1 Dynamic contents
The contents of websites may change over time so the same web page would
not have the same objects every day. For example, video website updates it-
self constantly based on the most popular viewed videos that are recommended
for its visitors. Moreover, news websites change their contents more than daily.
Therefore, these dynamic changes may reduce the recognition rate of websites
fingerprints across browsers. This impact is limited because the change will be
in some contents of a web page rather than its template/structure which may be
changed infrequently.
5.3.2 Localization
There is another factor that may reduce the recognition rate of websites finger-
prints which is known as website localization so the visits of same website may
result in different contents depending on its locality. For example, the contents of
”www.google.com.sa” is different from ”www.google.com.in” contents depends on
specified localization so in our website fingerprinting attack we have considered
localization factor. As it is shown in Figure 5.6 that the contents of the same
website is different based on its locality. Fortunately, in the Figures tow ads from
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Google that are provided based on the interest of different localizations.
Figure 5.10: Different contents for the same website that shows website localiza-
tion.
It is worth mentioning that when Tor is used the locality is determined by the
exit relay of Tor which is selected randomly rather than by the client’s location for
the sake privacy protection (Anonymity). Therefore, when Tor is used the locality
approach affects the website fingerprinting attack results. This happens when
the locality of a target website is not specified exactly in the address bar of the
browser such as www.google.com without specifying if it is ”www.google.com.sa”
or ”www.google.com.in”. As a result, we argue that the accuracy of website
fingerprinting attack on Tor will be affected on websites that don’t specify the
locality of a target domain.
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5.3.3 Recommendation
Our results show that the active contents such as JavaScript and CSSs features
make the web pages fingerprints more recognizable. Their impact is more obvious
in IE so it has the highest recognition rate of website fingerprinting compared
to other browsers. So we argue that the most obvious resistance against website
fingerprinting attack is to disable all active contents in web browsers. The disad-
vantage of this defense method is that many web services will be disabled but it
will protect web user privacy against traffic analysis attack substantially. These
active contents are real threat to web user privacy in anonymous web-browsing
thus anonymous systems like Tor warn its users to disable active contents in their
browsers.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
In this thesis we investigated our web page fingerprinting attack to study various
resistances of popular web browsers by detecting their network traffic patterns
using traffic analysis. Our attack significantly outperforms previous attacks in
tow folds: First, we implemented web page fingerprinting attack on the most
commonly used web browsers which outperforms previously proposed attacks
that used only a single browser ”Firefox”. Second, we investigated the browser-
dependent features to uncover the underlying causes that stand behind different
resistances of the top five browsers. Our website fingerprinting attack can deter-
mine which web page a victim may visit with a success rate of 74%, 70.4%, 69.6%,
53.8% and 41.6% by IE, FF, Chrome, Safari and Opera respectively. From our
results we conclude that the least privacy protection can be introduced by IE as
we got the highest recognition rate compared to other browsers. FF and Chrome
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approximately have the same resistance. The highest protection against traffic
analysis attack is introduced by Opera followed by Safari because of their own
dependent causes mentioned above. The aim of applying website fingerprinting
attack using top browsers is to empower web users with the awareness of pri-
vacy protection that would provide them with the feedback about the level of
anonymity that can be introduced by each browser and which browser that can
add adequate anonymity. In future work we plan to further investigate on more
fine-grained web pages dataset to evaluate to which range each browser protects
against websites fingerprinting attack on different websites classes (e.g. business
websites, news websites, social networking sites, Forum websites, Gallery Web-
sites, Gaming websites, Search engine sites, etc). Furthermore, a hot research
issue is that this research can be applied on more restricted mobile browsers (e.g.
Android, Dolphin, etc.) since a lot of people today use their smart devices like
mobile phones and tablets to browse internet in their daily life. Thus, their pri-
vacy can be endangered with the recent capturing tools that can eavesdrop their
traffic wirelessly. Future work should include additional features other than of
desktop browses which fit the restriction of mobile browsers in order to raise the
privacy awareness of mobile users.
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